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Author SHA1 Message Date
Hernâni Marques
44c6a870a6
docs: hernani-home path map GOA landings backups 2026-09-19 02:28:03 +02:00
Hernâni Marques
8c588742dd
docs: daylog 2026-09-19 goa-regio-ng login-health monitoring 2026-09-19 02:18:26 +02:00
Hernâni Marques
74aa6e5ecf
docs: ISSUES I-07 host Tor not koopa-tor-relay 2026-09-19 02:05:47 +02:00
Hernâni Marques
50d461379a
docs: README shorten single-CTR GOA + host Tor 2026-09-19 01:52:14 +02:00
Hernâni Marques
4974032188
docs: ports + koopa-setup goa-regio-ng pasta map 2026-09-19 01:38:51 +02:00
Hernâni Marques
82879637b6
ops: host tor.service SoT drop configs/tor CTR 2026-09-19 01:22:33 +02:00
Hernâni Marques
b9e2541941
docs: remove host/overview LIVE services inventory 2026-09-19 01:05:09 +02:00
Hernâni Marques
c68e4a50cb
docs: login-health README single-CTR GOA inventory 2026-09-19 00:48:42 +02:00
Hernâni Marques
fb3ca7be10
ops: login-health CRITICAL goa-regio-ng drop legacy CTRs 2026-09-19 00:31:17 +02:00
20 changed files with 185 additions and 1119 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
# 2026-09-19 — GOA single-CTR: login-health + monitoring
## Why
`koopa-login-health` FAIL×3 on dead `taler-hacktivism*` + WARN `koopa-tor-relay`.
Live stack is **`goa-regio-ng`** (pasta 9010–9015) + host **`tor.service`** (ORPort 8080).
## Live SoT (hernani@koopa)
| Piece | Detail |
|-------|--------|
| GOA CTR | `goa-regio-ng` — image `localhost/goa-regio-ng:empty-current` |
| Scripts | `~/scripts/taler-shared/goa-regio-ng/` · `goa-all-in-one.sh` |
| Bak | `~/backups/goa/current` |
| Landings | host `/var/www/*-landing/` + `~/goa-landing-deploy` · Caddy outside CTR |
| Tor | host `tor.service` — **not** container `koopa-tor-relay` |
| Forgejo | `:9024/:9200` · edge Caddy `:9000/:9001` |
## Repo changes (magikoopa, no push yet)
**koopa-admin-log**
- `scripts/login-health/`: CRITICAL/EXPECT → `goa-regio-ng` (+ forgejo); drop legacy + tor-relay; host `tor.service` check; probes 9010–9012
- delete `host/overview/{LIVE,services}.*` · delete `configs/tor/*`
- rewrite `host/tor/README.md` · shorten README / ports / koopa-setup / login-health README
- ISSUES I-07 → host Tor SoT
**elelmon + taler-monitoring** (EQ scripts mirrored)
- BANK=EX=MER=`goa-regio-ng`; drop nginx-in-bank; host stats.json fallback
- `check_{server,inside,urls,versions,e2e,sanity}.sh` · `metrics.sh` · `lib.sh` · docs
## Verify (after deploy on koopa — Freigabe)
```bash
koopa-login-health show -v
# expect: goa-regio-ng OK · no taler-hacktivism* · tor.service OK|WARN
```
STATE dir name `taler-hacktivism-monitoring` kept (host-agent path, not CTR).

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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Stand **2026-07-18** (koopa, live). Keine Secrets.
| [I-04](#i-2026-07-16-04) | low | open | Stray `kind_taussig` |
| [I-05](#i-2026-07-16-05) | low | open | Alte exited Podman-Container |
| [I-06](#i-2026-07-16-06) | low–medium | open | Nym HTTP API `*:9080` |
| [I-07](#i-2026-07-16-07) | medium | **fixed** | Tor host vs `koopa-tor-relay` |
| [I-07](#i-2026-07-16-07) | medium | **fixed** | Tor = host `tor.service` (not container) |
| [I-08](#i-2026-07-17-08) | medium | open | Landing-stats → standalone `taler-landing-stats` |
| [I-09](#i-2026-07-18-09) | high | open | Monitoring-HTML öffentlich: Caddy/www (code 21) |
@ -134,24 +134,18 @@ Hinweis: `nym-node` startet intern mit `--http-bind-address [::]:8080` (Containe
### I-2026-07-16-07
**`koopa-tor-relay` vs host `tor.service` (Port-Clash)**
Severity: medium · Host: koopa · Status: **fixed** 2026-07-16
**Tor = host `tor.service` (ORPort 8080)**
Severity: medium · Host: koopa · Status: **fixed** (SoT 2026-09)
**War:** Nach Reboot crash-loopte `koopa-tor-relay` — Host-`tor.service` hielt **8080**/**9051**.
**Soll:** nur Container (`KoopaRelay`, ORPort **8080**, VeciGate WAN→koopa:8080).
**Fix:** Host-Tor gestoppt/disabled; ggf. hängenden Prozess gekillt; User-Unit:
**Live:** host **`tor.service`** · ORPort **8080** · ControlPort **9051** · non-exit.
Legacy CTR `koopa-tor-relay` / `configs/tor/` removed from inventory (git history keeps them).
```bash
sudo systemctl disable --now tor
sudo systemctl mask tor # optional
systemctl --user enable --now container-koopa-tor-relay.service
systemctl status tor
ss -lntp | grep -E '8080|9051'
podman ps --filter name=koopa-tor-relay
# login-health: WARN if tor.service not active
```
**Live (nach Fix):** Host-`tor` inactive/disabled; `koopa-tor-relay` Up; 8080 + 127.0.0.1:9051 vom Relay-Prozess.
---
### I-2026-07-17-08
@ -177,4 +171,4 @@ Severity: medium · Host: koopa · Status: open · **TODO (noch nicht umsetzen a
- Prod-Container mit Boot-Autostart: Up
- Taler-Ports 9010–9015 antworten (401/302 OK)
- Linger=yes, container-*-Units enabled
- Tor-OR: Container-Pfad (I-07 fixed)
- Tor-OR: host `tor.service` (I-07)

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@ -8,8 +8,7 @@ Ops log and config mirror for host **koopa** (openSUSE Tumbleweed).
## FIND / setup entry
Plain file **`koopa-setup`** — lab + host pointers (mytops-local, regio-ng,
ports, daylogs). Start there before hunting under `configs/` / `2026/`.
Plain file **`koopa-setup`** — lab + host pointers (goa-regio-ng, ports, daylogs). Start there.
## Open issues
@ -25,78 +24,35 @@ ports, daylogs). Start there before hunting under `configs/` / `2026/`.
Hosted on **Forgejo rootless** (this host). See `2026/2026-07-10--admin-log-origin-forgejo.md`.
## FIND / setup entry
Plain file **`koopa-setup`** — lab + host pointers (mytops-local, regio-ng,
ports, daylogs). Start there before hunting under `configs/` / `2026/`.
## Layout
```
koopa-setup # FIND: lab/host setup pointers
host/ # openSUSE host-level config + overview
overview/services.md # graphical service map
systemd/ firewalld/ caddy/ network/
configs/ # mirrored app configs (caddy, taler, forgejo, …)
taler-hacktivism/ # merchant container taler-hacktivism
taler-hacktivism-bank/ # bank container (image …-banking)
taler-exchange/ # exchange conf (inside ansible container)
taler-exchange-ansible/ # container taler-hacktivism-exchange-ansible
forgejo/ # rootless git.hacktivism.ch
castopod/ bonfire/ lemmy/ prime/ # compose mirrors (no secret values)
tops/ # koopa-tops-ng1…ng3 + autostart unit
tor/ # KoopaRelay ORPort 8080
scripts/ # merchant, exchange, monitoring helpers
taler-merchant/ # merchant-model start scripts
taler-exchange/ # same model; archive/ = greenfield bootstrap
host/ # openSUSE host-level (caddy, tor, systemd, …)
configs/ # mirrored app configs (caddy, forgejo, …)
scripts/ # login-health, GOA helpers, …
login-health/ # SSH login snapshot
taler-shared/goa-regio-ng/ # live GOA SoT
2026/ # day logs + dated topic notes
```
## Live containers (podman)
## Live GOA + public stack
**Authoritative snapshot of host koopa:** [`host/overview/LIVE.md`](host/overview/LIVE.md) (refreshed from live).
| Name (podman) | Role | Host port |
|---------------|------|-----------|
| `taler-hacktivism` | merchant | **9010** (+ landing **9015**) |
| **`taler-hacktivism-exchange-ansible`** | exchange (Ansible/systemd) | **9011** (+ landing **9014**) |
| `taler-hacktivism-bank` | libeufin-bank (GOA) | **9012** (+ landing **9013**) |
| `koopa-castopod` (+ mariadb/redis) | Castopod | **9020** |
| `koopa-bonfire` (+ postgres) | Bonfire | **9021** |
| `koopa-lemmy-proxy` (+ lemmy/ui/pictrs/db) | Lemmy | **9026** |
| `koopa-prime-jellyfin` | Jellyfin | **9022** |
| `koopa-prime-qbittorrent` | qBittorrent | **9023** |
| Name | Role | Host ports |
|------|------|------------|
| **`goa-regio-ng`** | bank + exchange + merchant (one CTR, pasta) | **9010–9012** APIs · **9013–9015** landings (host nginx) |
| `koopa-forgejo` (+ postgres) | Forgejo rootless | **9024** + SSH **9200** |
| `koopa-tops-ng1` … `ng3` | static nginx | **9090**–**9092** |
| `koopa-castopod` / bonfire / lemmy / decidim / … | optional apps | **9020+** |
| `koopa-tops-ng1`…`ng3` | static nginx | **9090–9092** |
| host **`tor.service`** | Tor relay | ORPort **8080** · ControlPort **9051** |
Start model (Taler merchant/bank): **root** `start_base_services_*` → `/usr/local/bin/start_*.sh`.
Start model (exchange): `~/ansible-taler-exchange/` → `run-container-koopa.sh` + `deploy-hacktivism-goa.sh`.
Start model (user apps): `hernani` → `cd ~/koopa-* && podman-compose up -d`.
Start model (tops): user unit `container-koopa-tops.service` (linger).
Start GOA: `scripts/taler-shared/goa-regio-ng/` · bak `~/backups/goa/current` · landings `~/goa-landing-deploy`.
Edge: Caddy **9000/9001** → 127.0.0.1 backends.
Login snapshot: `scripts/login-health/` (`koopa-login-health`).
Public hosts: `taler.` / `exchange.` / `bank.` / `castopod.` / `bonfire.` / `prime.` / `bt.` / **`git.hacktivism.ch`** / `lemmy.` / `tops.ng1`–`ng3`.hacktivism.ch
(Caddy → 9010–9015 / 9020–**9026** / **9090–9092**; git-SSH host **9200** direct).
Service **details**: `configs/taler-hacktivism*`, `configs/taler-exchange*`, `configs/forgejo/`, `configs/tops/`, `scripts/*`.
Host-wide picture: **`host/overview/services.md`**.
Port table: **`configs/ports.md`**.
Tor: **`host/tor/README.md`**.
Router: **`../vecigate-admin-log`**.
**Benchmarks** (drive from the local machine, measure on koopa): **`benchmarks/`**
→ amount ladder: `benchmarks/amount-ladder/`.
**Exchange snapshot/restore (GOA, local images only):**
→ `2026/2026-07-09--exchange-snapshot-and-restore.md`
**Exchange `/keys` + Wire + bank account (diagram):**
`configs/taler-exchange/README.md` (section “/keys, Wire and Account”).
**Castopod (stack/accounts/boot — not podcast content):**
`2026/2026-07-09--castopod-content.md` → https://castopod.hacktivism.ch/
**Bonfire FEDERATE + guest public (2026-07-10):**
`2026/2026-07-10--bonfire-federate.md` → https://bonfire.hacktivism.ch/
(ground zero: `2026/2026-07-09--bonfire-ground-zero.md`)
**Forgejo rootless (git.hacktivism.ch, no free registration, SSH :9200):**
`2026/2026-07-10--forgejo-rootless.md` → https://git.hacktivism.ch/
**Benchmarks:** `benchmarks/`
**Forgejo:** `2026/2026-07-10--forgejo-rootless.md` → https://git.hacktivism.ch/

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# Port map (see also host/overview/services.md)
# Port map (koopa)
| Port | Role |
|------|------|
@ -7,45 +7,43 @@
| 443 | systemd `https-proxy.socket` → Caddy **9001** |
| 9000 | Caddy HTTP + ACME webroot |
| 9001 | Caddy HTTPS (vhosts) |
| 9010 | podman `taler-hacktivism` (merchant) |
| 9011 | podman **`taler-hacktivism-exchange-ansible`** (exchange) |
| 9012 | podman `taler-hacktivism-bank` (libeufin-bank) |
| 9013–9015 | bank / exchange / merchant public landings |
| 9020 | podman `koopa-castopod` → Caddy `castopod.hacktivism.ch` |
| 9021 | podman `koopa-bonfire` → Caddy `bonfire.hacktivism.ch` |
| 9022 | podman `koopa-prime` (Jellyfin) → Caddy `prime.hacktivism.ch` |
| 9023 | podman qBittorrent → Caddy `bt.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9024** | podman **`koopa-forgejo`** (HTTP) → Caddy **`git.hacktivism.ch`** |
| **9025** | podman **`koopa-paivana`** (portal paywall) → Caddy **`paivana.hacktivism.ch`** |
| **9026** | podman **`koopa-lemmy-proxy`** → Caddy **`lemmy.hacktivism.ch`** |
| **9027** | podman **`koopa-decidim`** → Caddy **`decidim.hacktivism.ch`** |
| **9028** | podman **`koopa-paivana-silverbullet`** → Caddy **`silverbullet.hacktivism.ch`** (app backend `172.17.0.1:19128`) |
| **9029** | podman **`koopa-paivana-galene`** → Caddy **`galene.hacktivism.ch`** (app backend `172.17.0.1:19129`; UDP 10000–10099 still Galene) |
| **9030** | podman **`koopa-paivana-cryptpad`** → Caddy **`cryptpad.hacktivism.ch`** (edge backend `172.17.0.1:19130`) |
| **9031** | podman **`koopa-paivana-meet`** → Caddy **`meet.hacktivism.ch`** (app backend `172.17.0.1:19131`) |
| **9032** | podman **`koopa-bbb-front`** (Ubuntu) → Caddy **`bbb.hacktivism.ch`** |
| **9200** | podman **Forgejo git-SSH** (host-direct; not Caddy) |
| 9090–9092 | podman `koopa-tops-ng1` … `ng3` → Caddy `tops.ng{1,2,3}.hacktivism.ch` |
| 8080 | Tor ORPort |
| **9010** | `goa-regio-ng` merchant API (HTTPS in CTR) |
| **9011** | `goa-regio-ng` exchange |
| **9012** | `goa-regio-ng` libeufin-bank |
| **9013–9015** | bank / exchange / merchant public landings (host nginx) |
| 9020 | `koopa-castopod` → `castopod.hacktivism.ch` |
| 9021 | `koopa-bonfire` → `bonfire.hacktivism.ch` |
| 9022 | `koopa-prime` (Jellyfin) → `prime.hacktivism.ch` |
| 9023 | qBittorrent → `bt.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9024** | `koopa-forgejo` (HTTP) → **`git.hacktivism.ch`** |
| **9025** | `koopa-paivana` → `paivana.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9026** | `koopa-lemmy-proxy` → `lemmy.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9027** | `koopa-decidim` → `decidim.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9028** | `koopa-paivana-silverbullet` → `silverbullet.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9029** | `koopa-paivana-galene` → `galene.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9030** | `koopa-paivana-cryptpad` → `cryptpad.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9031** | `koopa-paivana-meet` → `meet.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9032** | `koopa-bbb-front` → `bbb.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9200** | Forgejo git-SSH (host-direct; not Caddy) |
| 9090–9092 | `koopa-tops-ng1`…`ng3` → `tops.ng{1,2,3}.hacktivism.ch` |
| **8080** | host `tor.service` ORPort |
| **9051** | host Tor ControlPort (loopback) |
VeciGate: WAN **80→9000**, WAN **443→9001**.
Public apps: Caddy vhosts on **9001** → 127.0.0.1:{9010–9015, 9020–9032, 9090–9092}.
Git SSH needs separate NAT/firewall **9200/tcp** if exposed to WAN.
Meet/Galene/BBB media UDP is separate from these HTTP ports.
Public apps: Caddy on **9001** → 127.0.0.1:{9010–9015, 9020–9032, 9090–9092}.
Git SSH needs **9200/tcp** if exposed to WAN.
| UDP range | Role |
|-----------|------|
| **10000–10099/udp** | **Galene** WebRTC (host publish + planned VeciGate DNAT → koopa) |
| (TBD) | Meet JVB / BBB media — allocate when Phase‑2 / full BBB leaves park |
| **10000–10099/udp** | Galene WebRTC |
| **1789** | podman **`koopa-nym`** mixnet (nym.com nym-node) |
| **1790** | podman **`koopa-nym`** verloc |
| **9080** | podman **`koopa-nym`** HTTP API (mapped from container 8080; Tor keeps **8080**) |
| **9180** | lab **`goa-regio-ng`** HTTP (loopback only; see `configs/lab-local/`) |
| **9322** | lab **`goa-regio-ng`** SSH/ansible (loopback only) |
| **8288** | lab **`mytops-local`** HTTP (loopback only) |
| **19000** | optional nym entry WS (gateway mode) |
| **51822/udp** | optional nym WireGuard (dVPN path) |
| **9180** | lab **`goa-regio-ng`** HTTP (loopback only; see `configs/lab-local/`) |
| **9322** | lab **`goa-regio-ng`** SSH/ansible (loopback only) |
| **8288** | lab **`mytops-local`** HTTP (loopback only) |
| Extra | Role |
|-------|------|
| **1789** | `koopa-nym` mixnet |
| **1790** | `koopa-nym` verloc |
| **9080** | `koopa-nym` HTTP API |
| **9180** | lab `goa-regio-ng` HTTP (loopback; `configs/lab-local/`) |
| **9322** | lab `goa-regio-ng` SSH/ansible (loopback) |
| **8288** | lab `mytops-local` HTTP (loopback) |
login-health inventory: `scripts/login-health/koopa-login-health.sh`.

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@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
# koopa-tor-relay — Tor non-exit relay
# Process is NOT root: debian-tor remapped to uid/gid 1000 for rootless
# podman + host volumes (~/koopa-tor-relay/{data,log} owned by hernani).
# Recreate container with: --user 1000:1000 --userns=keep-id (see README).
FROM docker.io/library/debian:stable-slim
ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends tor nyx ca-certificates tor-geoipdb \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \
&& mkdir -p /var/lib/tor /var/log/tor \
&& groupmod --gid 1000 debian-tor \
&& usermod --uid 1000 --gid 1000 debian-tor \
&& chown -R debian-tor:debian-tor /var/lib/tor /var/log/tor \
&& chmod 700 /var/lib/tor
EXPOSE 8080 9051
USER debian-tor:debian-tor
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/bin/tor"]
CMD ["-f", "/etc/tor/torrc", "--runasdaemon", "0"]

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@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
# Tor relay — koopa (`KoopaRelay`)
Live: **podman** container **`koopa-tor-relay`** (rootless hernani, `--network host`).
Host layout: `~/koopa-tor-relay/{torrc,data,log,build}`.
Mirror in this repo: `configs/tor/`.
| Setting | Value |
|---------|--------|
| Nickname | `KoopaRelay` |
| Fingerprint | `02C7EECCDF7814FBA2DB1CBAED000D06E8A32EE8` |
| ORPort | **8080** (IPv4 + IPv6; VeciGate WAN DNAT → koopa:8080) |
| ControlPort | **127.0.0.1:9051** |
| ExitRelay | **0** (non-exit) |
| SocksPort | **0** |
| MyFamily | `52BB94DDC1292F950CF728708AC48523E018A718` |
| Bandwidth* | 2000 MBytes rate/burst |
| Image | `localhost/koopa-tor-relay:latest` (Debian stable + tor + nyx) |
| Process user | **non-root** `debian-tor` remapped to **uid/gid 1000** (`USER` in image) |
| Rootless note | recreate with `--user 1000:1000 --userns=keep-id` so `~/koopa-tor-relay/data` (hernani) stays writable |
## Files
| File | Role |
|------|------|
| `torrc` | Active policy (mounted read-only into container) |
| `Containerfile` | Image build (tor, nyx, tor-geoipdb); **not** root process |
| `create-container.sh` | Recreate container non-root + host net + volume mounts |
| `migrate-identity.sh` | One-shot copy of `/var/lib/tor` → container data (same identity) |
| `container-koopa-tor-relay.service` | systemd --user unit template |
| `torrc.minimal` / `torrc.sample` | Distro templates (reference) |
## Ops
```bash
# build image + recreate non-root container (as hernani)
cd ~/koopa-tor-relay/build # or configs/tor mirror
podman build -t localhost/koopa-tor-relay:latest -f Containerfile .
./create-container.sh # or: bash configs/tor/create-container.sh
podman start koopa-tor-relay
systemctl --user enable --now container-koopa-tor-relay.service
# status
podman ps --filter name=koopa-tor-relay
podman exec koopa-tor-relay id # expect uid=1000(debian-tor)
systemctl --user status container-koopa-tor-relay
ss -lntp | grep -E '8080|9051'
tail -f ~/koopa-tor-relay/log/notices.log
# monitor
podman exec -it koopa-tor-relay nyx
```
### Cutover (host package → container)
1. `sudo systemctl stop tor && sudo systemctl disable tor` (prefer `mask` so it never returns)
2. `sudo ~/koopa-tor-relay/migrate-identity.sh` (or copy of this script)
3. `podman start koopa-tor-relay` / user unit enable
4. Confirm fingerprint and ORPort reachability
Do **not** run host `tor.service` and the container at the same time.
Monitoring helpers: `scripts/monitoring/tor_*.sh`.
Firewall: `configs/firewalld/public-ports.md` (**8080/tcp**).
Router: `../vecigate-admin-log` (WAN :8080 → koopa).

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@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# container-koopa-tor-relay.service
# Install on koopa as hernani:
# mkdir -p ~/.config/systemd/user
# cp configs/tor/container-koopa-tor-relay.service ~/.config/systemd/user/
# systemctl --user daemon-reload
# systemctl --user enable --now container-koopa-tor-relay.service
# Requires: loginctl enable-linger hernani (root, once)
#
# autogenerated by Podman 5.8.3 (paths are host-specific; regenerate if container id changes)
[Unit]
Description=Podman container-koopa-tor-relay.service
Documentation=man:podman-generate-systemd(1)
Wants=network-online.target
After=network-online.target
RequiresMountsFor=/run/user/1000/containers
[Service]
Environment=PODMAN_SYSTEMD_UNIT=%n
Restart=always
TimeoutStopSec=70
ExecStart=/usr/bin/podman start koopa-tor-relay
ExecStop=/usr/bin/podman stop -t 10 koopa-tor-relay
ExecStopPost=/usr/bin/podman stop -t 10 koopa-tor-relay
Type=forking
[Install]
WantedBy=default.target

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@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Recreate koopa-tor-relay as non-root (uid 1000) under rootless podman keep-id.
# Run as hernani on koopa (not root). Stops/removes existing container first.
set -euo pipefail
NAME=koopa-tor-relay
IMAGE="${TOR_IMAGE:-localhost/koopa-tor-relay:latest}"
BASE="${KOOPA_TOR_BASE:-$HOME/koopa-tor-relay}"
if [[ ! -f "$BASE/torrc" ]]; then
echo "ERROR: missing $BASE/torrc" >&2
exit 1
fi
mkdir -p "$BASE/data" "$BASE/log"
# Host ownership: hernani (uid 1000) ↔ container debian-tor (uid 1000) via keep-id
chmod 700 "$BASE/data" 2>/dev/null || true
if podman ps -a --format '{{.Names}}' | grep -qx "$NAME"; then
podman stop "$NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
podman rm "$NAME"
fi
podman create \
--name "$NAME" \
--replace \
--network host \
--user 1000:1000 \
--userns keep-id \
--restart unless-stopped \
-v "$BASE/torrc:/etc/tor/torrc:ro" \
-v "$BASE/data:/var/lib/tor:Z" \
-v "$BASE/log:/var/log/tor:Z" \
--label org.hacktivism.service=tor \
--label org.hacktivism.container=koopa-tor-relay \
--label org.hacktivism.managed_by=koopa-admin \
"$IMAGE"
echo "created $NAME (user 1000:1000, userns=keep-id, host net)"
echo "start: podman start $NAME # or systemctl --user start container-koopa-tor-relay"

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@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Copy host Tor identity → container data. Works with: sudo ./migrate-identity.sh
set -euo pipefail
if [[ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]]; then
exec sudo -H "$0" "$@"
fi
OWNER="${SUDO_USER:-hernani}"
if [[ "$OWNER" == root ]]; then OWNER=hernani; fi
BASE="$(getent passwd "$OWNER" | cut -d: -f6)/koopa-tor-relay"
SRC=/var/lib/tor
DST="$BASE/data"
if [[ ! -d "$BASE" ]]; then
echo "ERROR: missing $BASE" >&2
exit 1
fi
if systemctl is-active --quiet tor 2>/dev/null; then
echo "ERROR: stop host tor first: systemctl stop tor" >&2
exit 1
fi
if command -v podman >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if runuser -u "$OWNER" -- podman ps --format "{{.Names}}" 2>/dev/null | grep -qx koopa-tor-relay; then
echo "ERROR: stop container first: podman stop koopa-tor-relay" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
echo "Copying $SRC → $DST (identity keys as $OWNER)…"
mkdir -p "$DST"
rsync -aHAX --delete "$SRC"/ "$DST"/
chown -R "${OWNER}:${OWNER}" "$DST"
chmod 700 "$DST"
echo "--- fingerprint ---"
[[ -f "$DST/fingerprint" ]] && cat "$DST/fingerprint" || echo "(no fingerprint file yet)"
[[ -f "$DST/fingerprint-ed25519" ]] && cat "$DST/fingerprint-ed25519" || true
echo "OK — $DST ready. Then: podman start koopa-tor-relay"

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@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
# KoopaRelay — active policy (podman koopa-tor-relay, host network)
# Live paths: ~/koopa-tor-relay/{torrc,data,log} on koopa
Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
Nickname KoopaRelay
ContactInfo info+koopa@hacktivism.ch
# dual-stack ORPort (IPv4 + IPv6)
ORPort 8080
ControlPort 127.0.0.1:9051
ExitRelay 0
SocksPort 0
MyFamily 52BB94DDC1292F950CF728708AC48523E018A718
BandwidthRate 2000 MBytes
BandwidthBurst 2000 MBytes
RelayBandwidthRate 2000 MBytes
RelayBandwidthBurst 2000 MBytes
DataDirectory /var/lib/tor

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@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
#SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
#SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SocksPolicy reject *
## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
#Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr
## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
#RunAsDaemon 1
## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
#ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
#CookieAuthentication 1
############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
#ORPort 9001
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
#Nickname ididnteditheconfig
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 20 KB.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 4 GB
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
#AccountingStart day 00:00
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
##
## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
#BridgeRelay 1
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#PublishServerDescriptor 0

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@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 28 February 2019 for Tor 0.3.5.1-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-editing-torrc/
## Tor opens a SOCKS proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SOCKSPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
#SOCKSPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
#SOCKSPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SOCKSPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SOCKSPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SOCKSPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SOCKSPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SOCKSPolicy accept6 FC00::/7
#SOCKSPolicy reject *
## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
#Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr
## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
#RunAsDaemon 1
## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
#ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
#CookieAuthentication 1
############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://community.torproject.org/relay for details.
## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
#ORPort 9001
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
## If you want to listen on IPv6 your numeric address must be explicitly
## between square brackets as follows. You must also listen on IPv4.
#ORPort [2001:DB8::1]:9050
## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
## OutboundBindAddressExit will be used for all exit traffic, while
## OutboundBindAddressOR will be used for all OR and Dir connections
## (DNS connections ignore OutboundBindAddress).
## If you do not wish to differentiate, use OutboundBindAddress to
## specify the same address for both in a single line.
#OutboundBindAddressExit 10.0.0.4
#OutboundBindAddressOR 10.0.0.5
## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
## Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 characters inclusive, and must
## contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
## If not set, "Unnamed" will be used.
#Nickname ididnteditheconfig
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 75 kilobytes per second.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes (per second), not
## bits (per second), and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10,
## 2^20, etc.
#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KBytes # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KBytes # But allow bursts up to 200KB (1600Kb)
## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "40 GB" may allow up to 80 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 40 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 40 GBytes
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
#AccountingStart day 00:00
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
##
## If you are running multiple relays, you MUST set this option.
##
#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://support.torproject.org/relay-operators/multiple-relays/
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentially reveal its IP/TCP address.
##
## If you are running multiple relays, you MUST set this option.
##
## Note: do not use MyFamily on bridge relays.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## Uncomment this if you want your relay to be an exit, with the default
## exit policy (or whatever exit policy you set below).
## (If ReducedExitPolicy, ExitPolicy, or IPv6Exit are set, relays are exits.
## If none of these options are set, relays are non-exits.)
#ExitRelay 1
## Uncomment this if you want your relay to allow IPv6 exit traffic.
## (Relays do not allow any exit traffic by default.)
#IPv6Exit 1
## Uncomment this if you want your relay to be an exit, with a reduced set
## of exit ports.
#ReducedExitPolicy 1
## Uncomment these lines if you want your relay to be an exit, with the
## specified set of exit IPs and ports.
##
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins.
##
## If you want to allow the same ports on IPv4 and IPv6, write your rules
## using accept/reject *. If you want to allow different ports on IPv4 and
## IPv6, write your IPv6 rules using accept6/reject6 *6, and your IPv4 rules
## using accept/reject *4.
##
## If you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end this with either a
## reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to)
## the default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://support.torproject.org/relay-operators
##
## Look at https://support.torproject.org/abuse/exit-relay-expectations/
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to the configured primary public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses,
## and any public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on any interface on the relay.
## See the man page entry for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow
## "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports on IPv4 and IPv6 but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv4 and IPv6 as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy accept *4:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv4 only as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy accept6 *6:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv6 only as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
## Uncomment this if you want your exit relay to reevaluate its exit policy on
## existing connections when the exit policy is modified.
#ReevaluateExitPolicy 1
## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
##
## Warning: when running your Tor as a bridge, make sure than MyFamily is
## NOT configured.
#BridgeRelay 1
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#BridgeDistribution none
## Configuration options can be imported from files or folders using the %include
## option with the value being a path. This path can have wildcards. Wildcards are
## expanded first, using lexical order. Then, for each matching file or folder, the following
## rules are followed: if the path is a file, the options from the file will be parsed as if
## they were written where the %include option is. If the path is a folder, all files on that
## folder will be parsed following lexical order. Files starting with a dot are ignored. Files
## on subfolders are ignored.
## The %include option can be used recursively.
#%include /etc/torrc.d/*.conf

31
host/hernani-home.md Normal file
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# hernani@koopa — home layout (SoT paths)
Terse map after GOA single-CTR. Live moves on koopa need Freigabe.
## GOA
| Path | Role |
|------|------|
| `~/scripts/taler-shared/goa-regio-ng/` | restore / all-in-one helpers (admin-log SoT) |
| `~/goa-regio-ng-scripts/` | optional live copy of helpers |
| `~/backups/goa/current` | CTR bak for restore |
| `~/goa-landing-deploy/` | host landings → `/var/www/*-landing/` |
| CTR `goa-regio-ng` | pasta **9010–9015**; landings+Caddy outside CTR |
## Monitoring state (not a CTR)
| Path | Role |
|------|------|
| `~/.local/state/taler-hacktivism-monitoring/` | elelmon/taler-monitoring host-agent state dir name (legacy string OK) |
## Tor
Host `tor.service` — ORPort **8080**, ControlPort **9051**. No `~/…/tor-relay` CTR.
## Other CTRs (unchanged)
Forgejo / social / media: see `configs/ports.md`. Inventory: `koopa-login-health`.
## Magikoopa laptop (ops junk)
Prefer under `$HOME/git/` + `$HOME/Archives/`; do not leave `/tmp/commit-*`, `/tmp/goa-*`, or loose `~/*.asc` / screenshots as SoT.

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@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
# Live inventory — koopa (2026-07-13)
Snapshot of **what runs on host koopa** (openSUSE Tumbleweed). No secrets.
Refresh command ideas:
```bash
hostname; date -R
podman ps --format 'table {{.Names}}\t{{.Image}}\t{{.Status}}\t{{.Ports}}'
systemctl is-active caddy
systemctl --user is-active container-koopa-tor-relay
systemctl --user is-active container-koopa-nym
ss -lntp | grep -E '90[0-9]{2}|9200|8080|9080|1789'
```
## Host
| Item | Value |
|------|--------|
| Hostname | `koopa` |
| Role | App host behind VeciGate (WAN :80→9000, :443→9001) |
| Edge | Caddy **9000/9001**, systemd socket proxies **80/443** |
| Tor | **podman `koopa-tor-relay`** (host net) ORPort **8080** dual-stack, ControlPort **127.0.0.1:9051** — not host `tor.service` |
## Running podman containers
| Name | Image | Ports (host) | Public site |
|------|--------|--------------|-------------|
| `taler-hacktivism` | `localhost/taler-hacktivism-live:landing` | **9010**, **9015** | `taler.hacktivism.ch` |
| **`taler-hacktivism-exchange-ansible`** | `localhost/taler-hacktivism-exchange-ansible:landing` | **9011**, **9014** | `exchange.hacktivism.ch` |
| `taler-hacktivism-bank` | **`localhost/taler-hacktivism-banking:live`** | **9012**, **9013** | `bank.hacktivism.ch` |
| `koopa-castopod` (+ mariadb, redis) | `castopod/castopod:1` | **9020** | `castopod.hacktivism.ch` |
| `koopa-bonfire` (+ postgres) | `bonfire:1.0.5-social-amd64` | **9021** | `bonfire.hacktivism.ch` |
| `koopa-prime-jellyfin` | `linuxserver/jellyfin:10.10.7` | **9022** | `prime.hacktivism.ch` |
| `koopa-prime-qbittorrent` | `linuxserver/qbittorrent:5.0.4` | **9023**, **6881** | `bt.hacktivism.ch` |
| `koopa-forgejo` (+ postgres) | `forgejo:11-rootless` | **9024**, **9200** | `git.hacktivism.ch` |
| **`koopa-paivana`** (+ upstream) | `localhost/koopa-paivana:latest` | **9025** | `paivana.hacktivism.ch` |
| `koopa-lemmy-proxy` (+ lemmy, ui, pictrs, db) | `lemmy:0.19.20` | **9026** | `lemmy.hacktivism.ch` |
| `koopa-decidim` (+ postgres, redis, sidekiq) | `decidim/decidim:0.30.8` | **9027** | `decidim.hacktivism.ch` |
| **`koopa-tor-relay`** | `localhost/koopa-tor-relay:latest` | **8080**, **9051** (host net) | Tor OR (non-exit) |
| **`koopa-nym`** | `localhost/koopa-nym:latest` | **9080**, **1789**, **1790** (+ opt. WG) | Nym mixnet node (nym.com) |
| `koopa-tops-ng1` | `nginx` | **9090** | `tops.ng1.hacktivism.ch` |
| `koopa-tops-ng2` | `nginx` | **9091** | `tops.ng2.hacktivism.ch` |
| `koopa-tops-ng3` | `nginx` | **9092** | `tops.ng3.hacktivism.ch` |
### Naming note (exchange)
Live exchange container is **`taler-hacktivism-exchange-ansible`** (not `taler-hacktivism-exchange-ansible` / not without `-ansible`).
Managed from **`/home/hernani/ansible-taler-exchange/`** (see `configs/taler-exchange-ansible/`).
## Caddy vhosts → backends
| Host | Backend |
|------|---------|
| `taler.hacktivism.ch` | 9010 (API) + 9015 (`/intro`) |
| `exchange.hacktivism.ch` | 9011 + 9014 (`/intro`) |
| `bank.hacktivism.ch` | 9012 + 9013 (`/intro`, terms, privacy) |
| `castopod.hacktivism.ch` | 9020 |
| `bonfire.hacktivism.ch` | 9021 |
| `prime.hacktivism.ch` | 9022 |
| `bt.hacktivism.ch` | 9023 |
| `git.hacktivism.ch` | 9024 (HTTP); git-SSH **9200** host-direct |
| `paivana.hacktivism.ch` | 9025 (paivana-httpd GOA paywall) |
| `lemmy.hacktivism.ch` | 9026 |
| `decidim.hacktivism.ch` | 9027 |
| `tops.ng1.hacktivism.ch` | 9090 |
| `tops.ng2.hacktivism.ch` | 9091 |
| `tops.ng3.hacktivism.ch` | 9092 |
Config: `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` (mirror `configs/caddy/Caddyfile`).
## Paths on host (`hernani`)
| Path | Role |
|------|------|
| `~/ansible-taler-exchange/` | Ansible + scripts for exchange-ansible container |
| `~/koopa-castopod/` | Castopod compose |
| `~/koopa-lemmy/` | Lemmy compose |
| `~/koopa-decidim/` | Decidim compose |
| `~/koopa-bonfire/` | Bonfire compose + gitbot |
| `~/koopa-prime/` | Jellyfin + qBittorrent |
| `~/koopa-forgejo/` | Forgejo rootless |
| `~/koopa-paivana/` | Paivana paywall (`koopa-paivana`) |
| `~/koopa-tops/` | tops.ng1–ng3 (`koopa-tops-ng*`) |
| `~/koopa-caddy/` | Caddyfile working tree on host |
| `~/koopa-tor-relay/` | Tor relay container (torrc, data/identity, log) |
| `~/koopa-nym/` | Nym nym-node (nym.com mixnet / NymVPN network) |
## Start models
| Stack | How |
|-------|-----|
| Taler merchant/bank | root `start_base_services_*` → service user → `/usr/local/bin/start_*.sh` |
| Exchange (GOA) | `~/ansible-taler-exchange/run-container-koopa.sh` then `deploy-hacktivism-goa.sh` |
| User apps | `cd ~/koopa-* && podman-compose up -d` |
| Lemmy | user units `container-koopa-lemmy-db` + `container-koopa-lemmy` (linger) |
| Decidim | user units `container-koopa-decidim-db` + `container-koopa-decidim` (linger) |
| tops (ng1–ng3) | user unit `container-koopa-tops.service` (linger) |
## Config mirrors in this repo (`configs/`)
| Live container | Git path |
|----------------|----------|
| `taler-hacktivism` | `configs/taler-hacktivism/` |
| `taler-hacktivism-bank` (image **…-banking**) | `configs/taler-hacktivism-bank/` |
| `taler-hacktivism-exchange-ansible` | `configs/taler-exchange-ansible/` + conf in `configs/taler-exchange/` |
| `koopa-tops-ng1` … `ng3` | `configs/tops/` |
## Related docs in this repo
| Topic | Doc |
|-------|-----|
| Ports | `configs/ports.md` |
| Diagram | `host/overview/services.md` |
| Exchange Ansible (koopa) | `configs/taler-exchange-ansible/` |
| Forgejo | `2026/2026-07-10--forgejo-rootless.md` |
| Bonfire public feeds | `configs/bonfire/public-feeds.md` |
| Castopod content | `2026/2026-07-09--castopod-content.md` |
| Decidim | `2026/2026-08-17--decidim.md` · `configs/decidim/` |

View file

@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
# Service overview — koopa
**Live container/port inventory:** [`LIVE.md`](LIVE.md) (state as observed on host).
Diagram
```mermaid
flowchart TB
subgraph Internet
Client[Client IPv4/IPv6]
end
subgraph VeciGate["VeciGate (MikroTik)"]
DNAT80["DNAT :80 → koopa:9000"]
DNAT443["DNAT :443 → koopa:9001"]
DNATSSH["DNAT :23235 → koopa:22"]
DNATTOR["DNAT :8080 → koopa:8080"]
end
subgraph Host["openSUSE host koopa"]
subgraph Edge["Edge on host"]
S80["systemd http-proxy.socket :80"]
S443["systemd https-proxy.socket :443"]
CaddyHTTP["Caddy :9000 HTTP\nACME + redirect"]
CaddyHTTPS["Caddy :9001 HTTPS"]
FW["firewalld public\n9000,9001,80,8080,ssh"]
end
subgraph Podman["podman rootless (hernani)"]
Merch["taler-hacktivism\n:9010"]
Exch["taler-hacktivism-exchange-ansible\n:9011"]
Bank["taler-bank-hacktivism\n:9012"]
Castopod["koopa-castopod\n:9020"]
Bonfire["koopa-bonfire\n:9021"]
Prime["koopa-prime jellyfin\n:9022"]
BT["qbittorrent\n:9023"]
Forgejo["koopa-forgejo ROOTLESS\n:9024 HTTP / :9200 SSH"]
Paivana["koopa-paivana\n:9025"]
Lemmy["koopa-lemmy-proxy\n:9026"]
Decidim["koopa-decidim\n:9027"]
end
Tor["tor ORPort :8080"]
SSH["sshd :22"]
end
Client --> DNAT80 --> CaddyHTTP
Client --> DNAT443 --> CaddyHTTPS
Client --> DNATSSH --> SSH
Client --> DNATTOR --> Tor
S80 --> CaddyHTTP
S443 --> CaddyHTTPS
CaddyHTTP -->|"/.well-known"| ACME["/var/www/acme"]
CaddyHTTP -->|other| Redir[301 HTTPS]
CaddyHTTPS -->|taler.hacktivism.ch| Merch
CaddyHTTPS -->|exchange.hacktivism.ch| Exch
CaddyHTTPS -->|bank.hacktivism.ch| Bank
CaddyHTTPS -->|castopod.hacktivism.ch| Castopod
CaddyHTTPS -->|bonfire.hacktivism.ch| Bonfire
CaddyHTTPS -->|prime.hacktivism.ch| Prime
CaddyHTTPS -->|bt.hacktivism.ch| BT
CaddyHTTPS -->|git.hacktivism.ch| Forgejo
CaddyHTTPS -->|paivana.hacktivism.ch| Paivana
CaddyHTTPS -->|lemmy.hacktivism.ch| Lemmy
CaddyHTTPS -->|decidim.hacktivism.ch| Decidim
```
## Port table
| Port | Listener | Backend / notes |
|------|----------|-----------------|
| 22 | sshd | LAN; WAN via 23235 |
| 80 | systemd socket | → 127.0.0.1:**9000** |
| 443 | systemd socket | → 127.0.0.1:**9001** |
| 9000 | caddy | HTTP + ACME |
| 9001 | caddy | HTTPS vhosts |
| 9010 | podman | **merchant** nginx |
| 9011 | podman | **exchange** httpd |
| 9012 | podman | **bank** libeufin |
| 9020 | podman | **castopod** |
| 9021 | podman | **bonfire** |
| 9022 | podman | **jellyfin** (prime) |
| 9023 | podman | **qbittorrent** (bt) |
| **9024** | podman | **forgejo** HTTP → `git.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9025** | podman | **paivana** → `paivana.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9026** | podman | **lemmy** → `lemmy.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9027** | podman | **decidim** → `decidim.hacktivism.ch` |
| **9200** | podman | **forgejo** git-SSH (host-direct) |
| 9090–9092 | podman | **tops** `koopa-tops-ng1`…`ng3` |
| 8080 | tor | ORPort |
Full port notes: `configs/ports.md`.
## Service index (details elsewhere)
| Service | Detail docs |
|---------|-------------|
| Caddy | `host/caddy/`, `configs/caddy/` |
| firewalld | `host/firewalld/` |
| systemd proxies | `host/systemd/` |
| Merchant container | `configs/taler-hacktivism/`, `scripts/taler-merchant/` |
| Exchange container | `configs/taler-exchange/`, `scripts/taler-exchange/` |
| **Forgejo rootless** | `configs/forgejo/`, `2026/2026-07-10--forgejo-rootless.md` |
| Paivana paywall | `configs/paivana/` |
| tops (`koopa-tops-ng*`) | `configs/tops/` |
| Tor relay (`koopa-tor-relay` podman) | `configs/tor/`, `host/tor/` |
| Tor monitoring scripts | `scripts/monitoring/` |
| VeciGate NAT | `../vecigate-admin-log/ip/firewall/nat/` |

View file

@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
Internet
|
+-------------+-------------+
| VeciGate |
| :80→9000 :443→9001 |
| :23235→22 :8080→8080 |
+-------------+-------------+
|
koopa 192.168.100.95
|
+----------------------+----------------------+
| | |
systemd Caddy other
:80 → 9000 :9000 HTTP sshd :22
:443 → 9001 :9001 HTTPS tor :8080
| |
+----------+-----------+
|
+-------+--------+
| |
:9010 merchant :9011 exchange
(nginx TLS) (httpd TCP)
| |
unix sock postgres/secmods

View file

@ -1,28 +1,13 @@
# Tor on koopa
**Runtime:** podman **`koopa-tor-relay`** (not host `tor.service`).
**Config mirror:** `configs/tor/` (`torrc`, Containerfile, migrate script, `create-container.sh`, user unit).
**Data/identity:** `~/koopa-tor-relay/data` (same keys as former `/var/lib/tor`).
**Process:** non-root **uid 1000** (`debian-tor`); recreate via `configs/tor/create-container.sh` after image rebuild.
| Port | Bind | Role |
|------|------|------|
| **8080** | `0.0.0.0` + `[::]` | ORPort (dual-stack) |
| **9051** | `127.0.0.1` | ControlPort (nyx / stem) |
Non-exit relay (`ExitRelay 0`, `SocksPort 0`).
### Root checklist
**Runtime:** host **`tor.service`** (not a podman container).
**Ports:** ORPort **8080** · ControlPort **9051** (loopback).
**Non-exit** relay (`ExitRelay 0`).
```bash
sudo systemctl disable --now tor
sudo systemctl mask tor
# linger already required for rootless user units:
# sudo loginctl enable-linger hernani
systemctl status tor
ss -lntp | grep -E '8080|9051'
```
### User unit
```bash
systemctl --user enable --now container-koopa-tor-relay.service
```
login-health: WARN if `tor.service` not active.
Legacy `koopa-tor-relay` / `configs/tor/` removed from live inventory (git history keeps them).

View file

@ -14,14 +14,18 @@ configs/ports.md
2026/2026-09-04--mytops-local-podman.md
# outward: ~/git/mytops-admin-log → git switch mytops-local
## goa-regio-ng
## goa-regio-ng (live GOA on koopa)
# single CTR goa-regio-ng · pasta 9010–9015 · landings host-side
# SoT: scripts/taler-shared/goa-regio-ng/ · bak ~/backups/goa/current
2026/2026-09-04--goa-backup-regio-ng.md
# outward: ~/src/regio-local/
configs/ports.md
scripts/login-health/
## host map
host/overview/
configs/ports.md
configs/caddy/
host/tor/README.md
SECRETS.md
ISSUES.md

View file

@ -1,115 +1,81 @@
# login-health — status on SSH login (koopa)
When you **SSH into koopa**, show a short **pre-collected** health snapshot so you see whether **git.hacktivism.ch** (Forgejo), Taler GOA, Caddy edge, and the rest of the LIVE inventory are up.
SSH login shows a short **pre-collected** snapshot: Forgejo, GOA (`goa-regio-ng`), Caddy edge, host Tor, rest of inventory.
Inventory source: `host/overview/LIVE.md`, `configs/ports.md`.
Inventory: `configs/ports.md` + this script’s arrays (not `host/overview/`).
## New / changed services (mandatory)
## New / changed services
Whenever a **new service** is added on koopa (or ports/vhosts change), update **in the same work package**:
Same package:
1. `koopa-login-health.sh` — `EXPECT_CONTAINERS`, `PROBES`, critical vs optional
2. `host/overview/LIVE.md` + `configs/ports.md` (and `services.md` if the diagram changes)
3. Deploy script to `~/.local/bin/koopa-login-health` on koopa (laptop commits/pushes; **no git commit on koopa**)
4. `koopa-login-health collect` so the next SSH login is not stale
2. `configs/ports.md`
3. Deploy → `~/.local/bin/koopa-login-health` on koopa (no git commit on koopa)
4. `koopa-login-health collect`
Grok workflows: `koopa-services-health` (inventory drift) + `commit-rules` (planning rule 10).
Workflow: `koopa-services-health`.
## Design: no probes at login
| Path | What runs |
|------|-----------|
| **systemd user timer** (every **5 min** + soon after boot) | `koopa-login-health collect` — podman, Caddy, loopback HTTP, write snapshot |
| **SSH / bashrc** | `koopa-login-health show` only — **cat** last snapshot (milliseconds, no curl/podman) |
| Path | What |
|------|------|
| **user timer** (5 min + after boot) | `collect` — podman, Caddy, Tor, loopback HTTP → snapshot |
| **SSH / bashrc** | `show` only — cat snapshot |
Snapshot files (`XDG_STATE_HOME`, default `~/.local/state/koopa-login-health/`):
| File | Content |
|------|---------|
| `status.compact` | login view (WARN/FAIL + overall) |
| `status.verbose` | full line list |
| `status.meta` | `overall=`, `collected_at=` (unix), RFC date |
If the snapshot is older than **`KOOPA_HEALTH_STALE_SEC`** (default **900** = 15 min), `show` prints a **stale** warning (timer likely down).
State: `~/.local/state/koopa-login-health/` (`status.compact` / `.verbose` / `.meta`).
Stale if older than `KOOPA_HEALTH_STALE_SEC` (default 900).
## Login must never break
| Guard | What it does |
|-------|----------------|
| **show only** | bashrc never runs `collect` |
| **`KOOPA_HEALTH_FROM_LOGIN=1`** | always exit 0 |
| **`timeout 2s`** | wall cap to cat a few KB |
| **`\|\| true` / `set +e`** | hook cannot abort the shell |
| **`bash -n`** on install | refuse a broken bashrc hook |
`KOOPA_HEALTH_FROM_LOGIN=1` → exit 0 · `timeout 2s` · `|| true` · `bash -n` on install.
Skip: `KOOPA_SKIP_HEALTH=1 ssh koopa`
## What you see
```text
koopa health koopa Wed, …
koopa health koopa Sat, 19 Sep 2026 …
git.hacktivism.ch = Forgejo :9024/:9200 · edge Caddy :9000/:9001
OK all critical checks passed (42 ok)
overall: OK ok=42 warn=0 fail=0
checked: Wed, … (3m ago) [timer snapshot; not live at login]
OK all critical checks passed (… ok)
overall: OK ok=… warn=0 fail=0
```
## Checks (on collect only)
## Checks (collect only)
| Area | What |
|------|------|
| Edge | `caddy.service`, proxy sockets |
| Tor | host `tor.service` (ORPort 8080 / ControlPort 9051) — WARN if down |
| Listen | critical + optional ports |
| Podman | LIVE container names |
| HTTP | loopback backends (2s curl, parallel) |
| Podman | `goa-regio-ng`, forgejo, optional apps |
| HTTP | loopback backends (2s curl) |
| Git SSH | TCP `:9200` |
**Critical** (→ overall FAIL): merchant, exchange, bank, forgejo, edge/critical ports.
**Optional** (→ WARN): castopod, bonfire, lemmy, decidim, prime, bt, paivana, tops, tor, nym.
**Critical** (FAIL): `goa-regio-ng`, `koopa-forgejo`, edge/ports **9010–9012**, **9024**, **9200**.
**Optional** (WARN): castopod, bonfire, lemmy, decidim, prime, bt, paivana, tops, nym.
Collect also checks **linger** and that Lemmy/Decidim user units are **enabled** (reboot survival).
GOA = single CTR `goa-regio-ng` (pasta **9010–9015**). Landings **9013–9015** host-side (`~/goa-landing-deploy`).
Legacy `taler-hacktivism*` / `koopa-tor-relay` are not expected.
Read-only. No restarts, no secrets.
## Install (on koopa as `hernani`)
## Install (koopa as `hernani`)
```bash
cd ~/src/koopa/koopa-admin-log
./scripts/login-health/install-login-health.sh
```
Installs binary, user units, bashrc hook, enables timer, runs one collect.
Linger (so the timer runs after reboot without an open SSH session):
```bash
sudo loginctl enable-linger hernani
```
## Manual
```bash
koopa-login-health # show compact snapshot
koopa-login-health show -v # verbose snapshot
koopa-login-health show -q # overall (+ stale note)
koopa-login-health collect # refresh now (same as the timer unit)
systemctl --user start koopa-login-health.service
koopa-login-health
koopa-login-health show -v
koopa-login-health collect
systemctl --user status koopa-login-health.timer
```
## Uninstall
```bash
systemctl --user disable --now koopa-login-health.timer
rm -f ~/.config/systemd/user/koopa-login-health.{service,timer}
systemctl --user daemon-reload
rm -f ~/.local/bin/koopa-login-health
# remove marked block in ~/.bashrc
rm -rf ~/.local/state/koopa-login-health
```
## Related
- Grok workflow `koopa-services-health` (laptop public HTTPS + generated mon pages)
- `scripts/taler-sanity/check_stack-health.sh` (deeper Taler, often root)
- `configs/ports.md` · `host/tor/README.md` (host Tor)
- units: `configs/systemd/user/koopa-login-health.{service,timer}`

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# koopa-login-health — read-only GOA/koopa service health.
# Inventory: koopa-admin-log host/overview/LIVE.md (+ ports.md).
# Inventory: configs/ports.md + arrays below (goa-regio-ng single CTR).
#
# Architecture:
# collect — run probes, write snapshot (systemd user timer; NOT on login)
@ -138,16 +138,12 @@ do_show() {
# ---------- COLLECT: probes → write snapshot ----------
CRITICAL_CONTAINERS=(
taler-hacktivism
taler-hacktivism-exchange-ansible
taler-hacktivism-bank
goa-regio-ng
koopa-forgejo
)
EXPECT_CONTAINERS=(
taler-hacktivism
taler-hacktivism-exchange-ansible
taler-hacktivism-bank
goa-regio-ng
koopa-castopod
koopa-bonfire
koopa-lemmy-proxy
@ -156,7 +152,6 @@ EXPECT_CONTAINERS=(
koopa-prime-qbittorrent
koopa-forgejo
koopa-paivana
koopa-tor-relay
koopa-nym
koopa-tops-ng1
koopa-tops-ng2
@ -167,7 +162,6 @@ OPTIONAL_CONTAINERS=(
koopa-prime-jellyfin
koopa-prime-qbittorrent
koopa-nym
koopa-tor-relay
koopa-tops-ng1
koopa-tops-ng2
koopa-tops-ng3
@ -268,6 +262,12 @@ do_collect() {
else
record FAIL "caddy.service is ${caddy_st} (edge HTTPS)"
fi
tor_st=$(systemctl is-active tor 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)
if [ "${tor_st}" = "active" ]; then
record OK "tor.service active"
else
record WARN "tor.service is ${tor_st} (host ORPort/ControlPort)"
fi
for sock in http-proxy.socket https-proxy.socket; do
st=$(systemctl is-active "${sock}" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)
if [ "${st}" = "active" ] || [ "${st}" = "listening" ]; then